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Abstract: The paper presents a new trapdoor-knapsack public-key cryptosystem. The encryption equation is
based on the general modular knapsack equation, but, unlike the Merkle-Hellman scheme, the knapsack com-
ponents do not have to have a superincreasing structure. The trapdoor is based on transformations between the
modular and radix form of the knapsack components, via the Chinese remainder theorem. The security is based
on factoring a number composed of 256 bit prime factors. The resulting cryptosystem has high density, approx-
imately 30% message expansion and a public key of 14 Kbits. This compares very favourably with the Merkle-
Hellman scheme which has over 100% expansion and a public key of 80 Kbits. The major advantage of the
scheme when compared with the RSA scheme is one of speed. Typically, knapsack schemes such as the one
proposed here are capable of throughput speeds which are orders of magnitude faster than the RSA scheme.
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a = the public knapsack vector = (al5 a2, . . . , an)
a' = the secret knapsack vector = (a\, a'2,..., a'n) also
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p = Y\Pi = the product of n distinct primes
PK = number of bits in the public key
r = number of bits in
S = the cryptogram = £ at • x,-
S' = the transformed cryptogram = S • W~i mod p also
equal to (S'(1), S'(2),..., S'(n)) in modular form
W = a secret modular multiplier, relatively prime to p
x = the message vector = (xl5 x2 , . . . , xn)
v = number of bits in the random-message tail
E = efficiency of the cryptosystem
1 Introduction
Public-key cryptosystems have received considerable
attention over the last few years [1]. This is because such
systems offer secure communications without the need for
prior key distribution and the possibility of digital signa-
tures. The two most important schemes are the RSA
scheme [2] and the trapdoor-knapsack scheme [3]. Of
these, the knapsack scheme has fallen into disfavour
because of successful attacks on the original Merkle-
Hellman scheme. Specifically, the attacks have not been on
the encryption equation which appears secure, but on the
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fact that the knapsack components are transformations of
a superincreasing sequence [4]. In addition, it has been
shown that if the density of the knapsack is low, where
density is loosely defined as the ratio of message text bits to
cryptogram bits, then even non-superincreasing knapsacks
are insecure [5, 6]. Finally, it should be noted that the
inherent message expansion that occurs in a knapsack
scheme makes the system difficult to use for authentica-
tion. There are ways round this problem [3], but the
inherent bijective mapping used in the RSA makes that
scheme superior for public-key digital signatures. Despite
these problems, knapsack schemes have one major practi-
cal advantage over the RSA scheme, and that is speed.
This is because the encryption and decryption processes
used are intrinsically faster than performing the modular
exponentiations needed in the RSA. Typically, knapsack
schemes can operate at throughput rates of 20 Mbits/s,
whereas the RSA is limited to about 50 Kbits/s, using
current technology.
The new trapdoor knapsack presented in this paper
uses the general modular knapsack equation (eqn. 1) and
does not require the knapsack components to be superin-
creasing. In addition, the system parameters can be chosen
to give a very high density secure cryptosystem. The trap-
door is based on being able to transform between the radix
and modular representations of the subset sums via the
Chinese remainder theorem [7]. The system bears a resem-
blance to the Lu-Lee [8] system, but, whereas their cryp-
tosystem is linear and has been shown to be insecure [9],
ours is based on the general modular knapsack equation,
which to date has not been generally broken.
In describing the algorithm we assume the reader is
familiar with public-key cryptography and its terminology.
If this is not the case, we refer the reader to one of the
many tutorial papers and books available [10, 11, 12].
2 New trapdoor
The general modular knapsack equation is given by
n
S — y a. • x. mod p (1)
When used for cryptography, the as are the n published
knapsack components, p is a published modulus, and the
xs are the message bits. In the binary knapsack the xs are
0 or 1, but, in the general knapsack, they are g bit
numbers. The subset sum S is the cryptogram which is sent
to the legitimate user, who is the only one who can unwind
the cryptogram back to the original xs.
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Let (p^ p2, . . . , pn) be a set of prime integers whose
product is given by
P=UP,
and where
af = cij mod Pi
is the residue of the yth knapsack component modulo the
ith prime. Then, by the Chinese remainder theorem
is a bijective mapping. That is, the transformation is one-
to-one for all as between 1 and p — 1. Thus, if the factor-
isation of p is kept secret, then only the legitimate user will
be able to transform the radix representation of the- knap-
sack components into their modular representation. This
forms the trapdoor. Let us now choose a set of n knapsack
components and express them in both radix and modular
form:
a = (2)
Let us then disguise the trapdoor by forming a new set of
knapsack components via the modular multiplication
= a'j W mod p (3)
where W and p are relatively prime, and W~l is the multi-
plicative inverse of W, modulo p.
We now publish p and the modified knapsack com-
ponents (a) in radix form. This is the public key. The fac-
torisation of p and the integer W are kept secret, and,
hence, so is the modular representation of the a'.
Now, let
that is, the primes are at least h + 1 bit numbers.
Let
that is, the message blocks are g bit numbers.
And let
Z
, j = 1
(4)
(5)
(6)
that is, the columns of a' sum to an r bit number.
In order to ensure that the encryption equation has a
unique decryption, we must ensure that the message to
ciphertext transformation JC—>S is injective. To guarantee
this we must have
h>r + g (7)
which also ensures that modular multiplication is equiva-
lent to matrix multiplication
M(1), a'[2\ .
i.e.
5" = x a'
and that the transformation can be inverted (provided the
matrix a' is nonsingular) via
x = S ' a' (8)
The cryptosystem then operates as follows. A user wishing
to send us a message forms the ciphertext
S = (x1 • ax + x2 • a2 +
via eqn. 1. We compute S'
S' = S • W'1 modp
xn • an) mod p
and express in modular form using our known factor-
isation of p
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we then apply x = S' • a' ~1, and hence recover the
message. The cryptanalyst must either break the factor-
isation of p or attack the trapdoor in some other manner.
3 Small example
We now give an example of the above method using n = 3.
The example is, of course, too small for security.
Let n = 3 and define p = (37, 41, 43); hence p = 65231
and h = 5 (eqn. 4). Choose g = 2, that is, the message com-
ponents are two-bit numbers. This dictates that r = 3 by
eqn. 7 (h = 5 ^ 3 + 2). Choose n = 3 knapsack com-
ponents which satisfy eqn. 6, that is, the columns of a' add
up to < 8, and express in both modular and radix form:
a\ =(3, 1, 1)^-125174
a' = a'2 =(1 , 5, 3) <-> 151664
fl'3 = (2, 1,2)^122509
Now choose W = 6553, which is relatively prime to
p = 65231. Perform the modular multiplication of eqn. 3
and publish the resulting knapsack components
a, = 50628
a2 = 59907
a3 = 3560
and the modulus
p = 65231
Compute the inverse W~l = 2618 via Euclid's algorithm
and invert the matrix a'
1+7 - 1 - 2 \
a"
1
 =(1/16)1+4 +4 - 8
\ - 9 - 1 +14 /
To transmit the 6 bit message x = (1, 2, 3) a user com-
putes the ciphertext
S = (1 • 50628) + (2 • 59907) + (3 • 3560)
= 181122
= 50660 mod 65231
Using the secret W~l the receiver computes
S' = 50660 • 2618 mod 65231
= 13257 mod 65231
and using the secret p is able to transform into modular
form
S' = (11, 14, 13)~ 13257.
From eqn. 8, the receiver computes
1 + 7 - 1 - 2 \
1 6 x = (ll, 14, 13)1+4 +4 - 8
\ - 9 - 1 +14/
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giving
x = (1, 2, 3) as transmitted.
4 Practical constraints
We now choose the values of n, r, g and h, needed to give a
secure practical cryptosystem.
First, consider the security of the trapdoor. In order to
ensure that the published p is not factored we set
255 (9)
so that the primes are at least 256-bit numbers.
Consider now an attack on the disguising modular
multiplication of eqn. 3. Re-arranging eqn. 3 for two parti-
cular knapsack components we can form
~
 a
'k " W = 0 mod p
and
ax — a\ • W = 0 mod p
Differencing these two equations we can then form
ak • a\ — ax • a'k = 0 mod p (10)
and, similarly, for all the residues modulo our secret
primes, we find
af - a, • a'k{i) = 0 mod p{ (11)
Given that the ak and ax are public, eqn. 11 shows that we
need sufficient randomness in the knapsack components in
order to prevent the attacker trying all possible pairs a\(l)
and a'k{l) and thus breaking the trapdoor. If we assume that
any number 1 ^ a'ji} ^  2r can be chosen to be a knapsack
component, then, to prevent the attack, we should set
r ^ 64 (12)
Secondly, let us consider the security of the knapsack. In
the past few years there have been rapid advances in
solving the basic knapsack problem [5, 6]. Although these
attacks have been on the binary knapsack (g = 1), the
techniques can be extended to cover the general knapsack
problem. The choice of g and n will determine the knap-
sack security.
In order to present a large knapsack problem we set
n • g 256 (13)
Consider now the value of n. This is affected by several
conflicting factors. First, n is influenced by the fact that the
general knapsack problem is not as secure as the binary
knapsack because the least significant bits of the message
are not as well hidden. We have reduced the problem by
performing the reduction mod p, but we must still set a
lower limit on n. If we use the parameters of eqn. 13 in a
binary knapsack, then g = 1 and n = 256, say. In this case,
the least significant bit of the subset sum depends on up to
256 bits of the message. In the general knapsack k > 1, and
so n is reduced via eqn. 13. Consequently, the involvement
of the least significant bit is also reduced.
In order to increase this involvement we can randomly
set the last v bits of each message subblock instead of using
these for information. We can show the average involve-
ment of the least significant information bit is then given
by n(v + l)2/2- The overall efficiency of the system will
then be degraded by a factor v/g. In order to protect the
least significant bits we should set
n • (y + \f
128 (14)
The final factor affecting n is the size of the public key, this
is given by
= n-(n+l)-(h bits (15)
As this varies with the square of n, we should aim to keep
n as small as possible, as well as h. From eqn. 9, we can set
h = 255. If we choose n = 7, then the size of the public key
is 14336 bits by eqn. 15, which compares favourably with
the Merkle-Hellman scheme.
Consider now the value of r, which also determines the
value of g via eqn. 7. A recent method of attacking knap-
sacks is given in Reference 5 and is based on forming a
lattice of rank n. If the density of the knapsack is low, then
this method can successfully break any binary knapsack.
In particular, if the density D is such that
n 1
log2 (max aj) log2 n
the method is successful. However, for the general knap-
sack, it is more difficult to find a suitable lattice. In our
case the density is given by
D = 9
h+ 1
if we assume the primes are all h + 1 bit numbers. So, to
minimise the redundancy of the scheme and to increase the
resistance to low density attacks, h should be as small as
possible. Thus, we set eqn. 7 to equality (h = r + g), so that
D = 9
Now, to maximise D, we must keep r small. From eqn. 12
we therefore set r = 64, giving g = 255 — 64 = 191. The
size of the message block is then n • g = 1337 bits, which
certainly satisfies eqn. 13. The efficiency of the system is
given by
E = g-y (16)
If we choose v = 6 in order to satisfy eqn. 14, then eqn. 16
gives E = 0.72.
The final system parameters are then n = 7, r — 64,
g = 191, h = 255 and v = 6. This gives a density D = 0.75,
a public-key size PK = 14336 bits and an overall efficiency
of£ = 0.72.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a new public-key cryp-
tosystem based on the general modular knapsack problem.
Its security is not based on disguising a superincreasing
sequence, but on the difficulty of factoring a number with
seven 256-bit prime factors and on a knapsack problem
with a typical density of 0.75 and a block size of 1337 bits.
The knapsack nature of the system ensures that fast
encryption and decryption are possible when compared
with the RSA public-key cryptosystem. In addition, the
size of the public key, which is typically 14 Kbits, is not
excessive when compared with 80 K bits for the Merkle-
Hellman scheme and 1 Kbits for the RSA. It may be pos-
sible to attack the trapdoor information via the methods
in Reference 5, but we can see no productive method of
doing this. The only successful attacks on dense trapdoor
knapsacks to date have been on the security of the super-
increasing sequence. Our method does not require this.
However, it may turn out that all injective trapdoor knap-
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sacks are solvable in polynomial time, in which case all
such schemes are useless for cryptography.
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